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In The Supreme Court
Of the State of Utah
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA
J. JOHANSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
6302

CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, CUDAHY PACKING
COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complaint filed in the Third District Court on
September 26, 1939, was demurred to by defendant on
the ground that it did not state a cause of action in favor
of plaintiffs and agaiust defendant. This demurrer
was sustained. Plaintiffs declined to plead further and
judgment was entered in favor of defendant. From that
judgmnet plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.
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The complaint in substance alleges that Robert Johanson, son of plaintiffs, was instantly killed on J nne 3,
1938, by an electric shock coming from electric wires
owned and maintained by defendant; that his death was
caused by the negligence of the defendant; that at the
time of his death he was working in the course of his employment ; that the employer was the Royal Crystal Salt
Company and that the insurance carrier was the London
Guaranty & Accident Company, Ltd.; that the dependent
father and mother applied to the Industrial Commission
for and were awarded workmen's compensation in the
sum of approximately $2500; that the insurance carrier
became subrogated to the rights of the plaintiffs in the
cause of action alleged against the defendant under and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 42-1-58, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933; that on the 29th day of August,
1939, the insurance carrier, ''for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered to the plaintiffs herein a
waiver of said right of subrogation and an assignment
of its cause of action against the said defendant herein,
and the plaintiffs are now the owners of said cause of
action against the defendants, with full right to bring
and prosecute this action." (See complaint, Tr. P. 3;
appellants' brief, P. 6).
It will be noticed it is nowhere alleged in the complaint that the insurance carrier has paid the compensation awarded, or any part of the same. In the Trial
Court the defendant contended, and contends in this
Court, that the waiver and assignment alleged in the
complaint are null and void.
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3
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DEATH CAUSED BY
TORTIOUS ACT IS THE CREATURE OF STATUTE; IT DID NOT EXIST AT COMMON LAW.
THE STATUTE DOES NOT CREATE A
PROPERTY RIGHT

Higgins vs. Butcher (1607) Yelverton, 89.
Baker vs. Bolton (1808), 1 Campbell, 493 .
.Admiralty Commissioners vs. 8. B. .Amerika
( 1917) A. C. 38; s. c. Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1917B,
P. 887.
Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame (1878) 95 U.
S. 754; 24 L. Ed. 580.
Thomas vs. Union Pacific Coal Co. (1875) 1
Utah, 232.
The rule announced by these cases may be put in
the language of Lord Ellenborough, used in 1808, as
follows:
"In a civil court the death of a human being
cannot be complained of as an injury.''
In the Brame case, supra, the United States Supreme Court said of this rule:

''It is impossible to speak of it as a proposition open to question.''
STATrrrES ENACTED
"Lord Campbell's Act," as it has been called, enacted by the English Parliament in 1846, did not a~olish
the rule of Baker vs. Bolton but created a new right or
remedy by way of exception to that rule. This Act be-
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came quite general as a statute in our various states.
Quite a number of states, however, have made the action
of a person injured survive his death. This was never
true in Utah. At least fifteen states, among which are
Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Louisiana,
Oklahoma and Montana, have such survivor statutes.
The first death statute of Utah was passed February 29, 1874. (Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, P. 397).
This statute was repealed and Section 3179 of the Laws
.of 1888 was substituted in 1884. This section remained
in force up to and after statehood, and became Section
2912 of the Revised Statutes of 1898.
The constitution of Utah, Article XVI, Section 5,
provided:
''The right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.''
This Constitutional provision was amended November 2, 1920, adding to the above language, ''except in
cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death
is provided for by law."
In the year 1921 Utah made extensive amendments
of its Workmen's Compensation Law. (See Chapter 67
of Laws of Utah, 1921, P. 165). In Section 3133 of this
Chapter 67 it was provided:
''If an employee under this Act be injured
or killed while in the course of his employment
by another not in the same employment, he or
his dependents in case of death, shall be entitled
to compensation and to no other remedy unless
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5
the employer be subject to the provisions of Section 3129 and 3130. No employee or the dependents in case of death shall be granted compensation in such case unless such employee or his
dependents, as the case may be, shall assign any
cause of action existing against the person responsible for or causing the injury or death to
the state insurance fund, if compensation is payable therefrom, and otherwise to the person or
association or corporation liable for the payment
of such compensation. And such cause of action
is by this section made assignable, whether it be
for injury or death, and the dependents or the
personal representative and not the heirs in such
case shall have the right and power to make a
full and exclusive assignment notwithstanding
Sections 6504 and 6505, Compiled Laws of Utah,
1917. " (Italics ours).
In the year 1933 the above section was amended,
and Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933 took
the place of the above Section 3133. Section 42-1-58
was made to read :
''When any InJury for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may
at their option claim compensation under this
title or have their action for damages against
such third person; and, if compensation is claimed
and awarded, the employer or insurance carrier
having paid the compensation shall be subrogated
to the rights of such employee or his dependents
to recover against such third person; provided, if
such recovery shall be in excess of the amount of
the compensation awarded and paid, then such
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excess, less the reasonable expenses of the action,
shall be paid to· the employee or his dependents.''
Section 2912 of the Revised Statutes of 1898 became
Section 6505 of the Compiled Laws of 1917. In 1933
said Section became Section 104-3-11 of the Revised
Statutes of 1933, and was made to read:
''Except as provided in chapter 1, of Title 42,
when the death of a person not a minor is caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his
heirs or his personal represntatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if
such person is employed by another who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such
other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his death, only one action can
be maintained for the injury to or death of such
person, and such action may be brought by either
the personal representatives of such adult deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by
such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided in the next preceding section. In every
action under this and the next preceding section
such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just:''
It will be noticed that in Section 3133 of Chapter
67 of the Laws of 1921 the legislature of this state commenced to make a distinction as between ''the dependents" of an employee suffering death in the course
of his employment and ''the heirs'' of such a person.
Said distinction is preserved in Section 42-1-58 of the
Revised Statutes of 1933.

After the cause of action, if any, accrued in the case
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at bar, the legislature of Utah in 1939 amended Section
42-1-58 to read as follows:
''When any injury for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act of another person not in the
same employment, the injured employee, or in
case of death his dependents, may at their option
claim compensation under this title or have their
action for damages against such third person;
and, if compensation is claimed and awarded, the
employer or insurance carrier having paid the
compensation shall be subrogated to the rights of
such employee or his dependents to recover
against such third person; provided, if such recovery shall be in excess of the amount of the
compensation awarded and paid, then ·such excess, less the reasonable expenses of the action,
shall be paid to the employee or his dependents.
Before being required to pay any compensation
or other benefits as provided in this title the employer or insurance carrier may require the employee or in case of death his dependents to make
a written assignment of any cause of action existing against the third person to such employer
or insurance carrier as the case may be.'' (Laws
of Utah, 1939, P. 70).
The conclusion seems to be compelled that a man
has no pecuniary interest in his own life, and that his
life has no pecuniary or money value either to himself
or his estate, and that his relatives and dependents have
only such an interest as is strictly personal to each of
them.
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POINT II
ONLY THE PERSONS NAMED IN THE STATUTE
CREATING THE RIGHT AND REMEDY FOR THE
RECOVERY 0 F DAMAGES F 0 R TORTIOUS
DEATH MAY INSTITUTE AND MAINTAIN THE
ACTION CREATED BY THE STATUTE.
6 Standard Encyc. of Procedure, P. 385.

Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame (1878) 95 U.
S. 754; 24 L. Ed. 580.
Thorpe vs. Union Pacific Coal Co., 24 Utah,
475; 68 Pac. 145 (1902).
These authorities establish the proposition that
when the legislature created a right of action to recover
damages for injuries resulting in the death of the person injured, the action must be brought in the name of
the person to whom the right is given by the statutes of
the state where the injuries were inflicted.

POINT III
THE ACTION, BEING STATUTORY AND PERSONAL IN ITS NATURE, CANNOT AND DOES NOT
SURVIVE THE DEATH OF EITHER ITS OWNER
OR THE WRONGDOER. IT DOES NOT PASS UPON
THE DEATH OF THAT OWNER TO THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OWNER'S ESTATE, AND THEREFORE IT IS NOT ASSIGN-
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ABLE UNDER THE TEST LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPRE1IE COURT OF THIS STATE AND
RECOGNIZED GENERALLY THROUGHOUT
THE UNITED STATES.
The survivability of actions is definitely defined by
the statutes of Utah, Sections 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and
102-11-7:
'' 102-11-5. Actions for the recovery of any
property, real or personal, or for the possession
thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to determine
any adverse claim thereon, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be maintained by and
against executors and administrators in all cases
in which the same might have been maintained
by or against their respective testators or inintestates.''
"102-11-6. Executors and administrators
may maintain actions against any person who
has wasted, destroyed, taken or carried away, or
converted to his own use, the goods of their testators or intestates in his lifetime. They may
also maintain actions for trespass committed on
real estate of the decedent in his lifetime.''
"102-11-7. Any person or his personal representative may maintain an action against the
executor or administrator of any testator or intestate, who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed,
taken or carried away, or converted to his own
use, the goods or chattels of any such person, or
committed any trespass on the real estate of such
person.''
These statutes have been in force in this state ever
since statehood, and were in force prior thereto, having
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been taken from the probate code of the State of California.
Brown vs. D. R. Wightman, Administrator
of V. C. Wightm(J!YI, (1915), 47 Utah, 31; 151
Pac. 366 ; L. R. A. 1916A, 1140.

Clark vs. Goodwin, Administrator, (1915 ),
170 Cal. 327 150 Pac. 357; L. R. A. 1916A, 1142.
In the case of Brown vs. Wightman, supra, it was
held that the suicide of one who had made a malicious
assault upon the plaintiff prevented recovery by the
plaintiff.
In the case of Clark vs. Goodwin from California,
it was held that the death of the wrongdoer Goodwin,
who had killed and murdered Clark, prevented any recovery by the widow of Clark.

Candland vs. Mellon (1915) 46 Utah, 519;
151 Pac. 341.
In this Candland case plaintiff in her lifetime had
obtained judgment against the defendent. After that
judgment became final in the District Court the plaintiff died and her administrator was substituted on appeal. The judgment of the Trial Court was reversed by
this Court, and when that judgment was reversed for
errors committed by the Trial Court it was held that
the cause of action did not survive the death of the original plaintiff.
The Court said:
''As we view the matter, we think the cause
does not survive. It was, however, merged in the
judgment which, had it not been disturbed, could
have been enforced, but when the judgment is
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gone the cause is gone." (Citing Mason vs. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah, 77; 24 Pac. 796).
The test of assignability is survivability.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. vs. Denver and
Rio Grande Ry. (1913), 44 Utah 26; 137 Pac. 653.
Lawler vs. Jennings (1898), 18 Utah, 35; 55
Pac. 60.
In Lawler vs. Jennings, supra, this Court said:
''The general test applied in determining
the assignability of a chose in action is whether
or not it would survive and pass to the personal
representative of a decedent. If it would so survive it may be assigned so as to pass an interest to
the assignee, which he can enforce in his own
name. If it does not so survive it is not assignable, either at law or in equity.''
In the National Union Fire Ins. Company case, supra, this Court said.
''The only test of assignability in this state
is whether the cause of action survives and passes
to the personal representative of a decedent.''
The appellants cite this case. It appeared that the
defendant had negligently caused the destruction by
fire of certain buildings situated upon the land of Minnie Witt; that these buildings had been insured by the
National Company, and that company had paid certain
insurance ; that she had assigned her claim against the
Railroad Company to the Insurance Company.
The Court held :
''The assignability of the claim sued on is
therefore indubitably established by our own statute.''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
It is difficult to see how this case can function for
the benefit of the appellants in the case at bar. There
never has been any statute in this state that provided
for the survivability of actions for personal injuries, or
actions for wrongful death, and consequently in the absence of express statute applying the test of survivability,
such actions are not assignable. It does not make any
difference whether the cause of action for death is controlled exclusively by the provisions of Section 42-1-58 or
by the provisions of the general death statute, Section
104-3-11.
POINT IV
WHEN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AMENDED SECTION 3133 OF CHAPTER 6~1
OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1921, AND ENACTED
SECTION 42-1-58 OF THE REVISED STATUTES
OF 1933, IT MANIFESTED A OLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO PROHIBIT THE ASSIGNABILITY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION REFERRED TO
IN SECTION 42-1-58
It will be noticed that the action against the third
person who wrongfully or negligently injures or kills
an employee while in the course of his employment with
a master was made assignable by the provisions of the
statute in force from the year 1921 until 1933. That
section has been quoted in full, and it among other things
provided ''and such cause of action is by this section
made assignable, whether it be for injury or death.''
In 1933 the legislature adopted the revision of the
statutes which became effective June 26, 1933, and it
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.. repealed all acts of a general and permanent nature
passed by the legislature of the State of Utah prior to
its twentieth regular session, - specifically excepting,
however, from such repeal certain specified provisions.
Section 3133 of Chapter 67 of the Laws of 1921 was not
within the excepted provisions, and was therefore repealed.
No more conclusive evidence could be offered of
the legislative intent to destroy the assignable character
of the cause of action in the case at bar than the express
repeal of the provision above quoted, and the fact that
the legislature in 1939 amended Section 42-1-58 of the
Revised Statutes of 1933, requiring the employee, or, in
.. case of death, his dependents, to make a written assignment of any cause of action existing against the third
person to such employer or insurance carrier, conclusively shows that the legislature has not intended that
such a cause of action should become property and subject to barter and sale. It is true that this amendment
of 1939 was not in force at the time of the death of Robert
Johanson.
POINT V
WHENEVER AN EMPLOYEE WAS KILLED
WHILE WORKING IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY1IENT BY THE WRONGFUL ACT 0 F A
THIRD PERSON, THEN THE DEPENDENTS OF
THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE BECAME VESTED
WITH ONE OF TWO ALTERNATIVE RIGHTS,
VIZ: EITHER TO CLAIM COMPENSATION FROM
THE EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE CARRIER, OR
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TO SUE AND RECOVER DAMAGES FROM THE
THIRD PERSON WHO WRONGFULLY CAUSED
THE DEATH OF THE EMPLOYEE
It is plain from the provisions of Section 42-1-58 of
the Revised Statutes of 1933 that the dependents of a
deceased employee who had been killed in the course
of his employment by the negligent act or wrong of a
third person were compelled to elect which of the two
rights and remedies they would take. If these dependents applied for and were awarded compensation from
the master, then the master or insurance carrier having
paid that compensation became vested with whatever
right existed as against the third person who wrongfully
or negligently caused the death of the employee. The
dependents, after having made that election, had no further interest in the cause of action against the third
person. The employer or insurance carrier, if there was
one, was vested with the entire cause of action and complete control of it. It is true that if the employer or insurance carrier recovered against the third person a
greater amount than was necessary to make reimbursement of the compensation paid, then the excess, less reasonable expenses, was turned over to the dependents.
Those dependents, having declined the right proferred
by the statute by accepting the award of compensation,
never acquired or had any interest in the surplus, if any,
over and above the amount of compensation paid and
reasonable expenses of making recovery until the action
had been merged into the judgment of recovery.

Lang vs. Brooklyn City R. Co. (1928), 217
N.Y. S. 277.
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Same case affirmed by N. Y. Court of Appeals, 247 N. Y. 551; 161 N. E. 178.
(In this case Chief Justice Cardozo and Justices
Pond, Lehman and Kellogg rendered an opinion sustaining the law as stated.)

Bruso's Case (1936),
; 4 N. E.
Mass.
(2d) 308.
In this case the Massachusetts Supreme Court was
construing a provision in some respects similar to Section 42-1-58. Chief Justice Rugg, speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, said :
''The provisions of Section 15, allowing an
insurer which has paid compensation to an employee injured by the tortious conduct of some
third person other than the employer, to enforce
the liability of such third person, fix the proportions of the amount recovered to be paid to the
employee and to be retained by the insure·r.
When such an employee accepts compensation
under the act, he waives all right of action against
such third person.''
Holmes vs. Henry Jennings Co. (1921), 7
Fed. (2d) 231.
The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon held :
''When a party has two remedies inconsistent
with each other, any decisive act by him done on
the knowledge of his rights and facts determine
his election. ' '
In the Lang case above cited it was held:
''Compensation insurance _carrier cannot reassign to injured employee surplus of its recovery
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against third person negligently causing InJury
over compensation paid.''

Hunt vs. Bank Line, 35 Fed. (2d) 136 (1929).
In this case the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held:
''Stevedore, who accepted compensation for
his injuries under Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, and who requested
his employer to bring suit against steamship line
for damages for negligence in accordance with
Sec. 33, held not entitled, on employer's refusal,
to maintain suit for damages in his own name,
since acceptance of compensation was election not
to sue for damages."
In the course of his opinion Circuit Judge Parker
said:
"We think it clear, in the light of other provisions which we have discussed, that this was
not intended to give to the employee who has accepted compensation any right or interest in, or
control over, the cause of action which is assigned
by the act to the employer. It is the employer,
to whom the cause of action is assigned upon payment of compensation, who is given the right of
deciding whether he will hazard the costs and expenses of suit. It is the employer who is given
the power to determine whether a compromise
shall be accepted or not. And the employee, having accepted the compensation which the law has
fixed, has no further interest in the matter, unless
the employer decides to sue and succeeds in recovering more than is necessary for his reimbursement. Then, and not until then, the interest
of such employee arises. And this is given by the
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statute to the employee, not, we think, because
he is deemed to ha,·e any interest in the cause of
action, but to avoid the unseemly spectacle of the
employer realizing· a profit from his injury.''
It is proper to say that the United States District
Court for the District of Utah has held that these plainiffs could not maintain this action. (See Johanson vs.
Cudahy Packing Company, Civil No. 11, minute entry
November 30, 1938. Files Clerk's office, United States
District Court for the District of Utah).

POINT VI
NO AUTHORITY CITED BY THE APPELLANTS IN
THEIR BRIEF SUSTAINS THE VALIDITY OF
THE ALLEGED ASSIGNMENT OR WAIVER.
The appellants apparently undertake to get some
benefit out of the statement that the insurance carrier
waived its right to subrogation. Full effect can be given
to any allegPd waiver of that right and yet such waiver
cannot vest the ownership of the cause of action, if one
is alleged, in the plaintiffs, appellants here. It is settled
law that under such a statute as Section 42-1-58 the dependents may have either compensation against the employer or insurance carrier, or may sue the third person
who tortiously caused the death of the employee. The
election to take one precludes the taking of the other.
The application for compensation and the acceptance of an award is an unequivocal election to take the
compensation and to forego and decline the cause of action against the third person, tor?~ The mere
fact that the insurance carrier ~to proceed
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against the third person, or refused to exercise the right
which it acquired under the statute, would not give the
dependents any right to proceed on such cause of action.
Before they could have that right it must be transferred
to them by a valid assignment, and it is the contention
of the respondent here that the right of the action cannot be assigned. The law does not per!¢t such an assignment. There is sound public policy ~t the prohibition of assignment. If such action were once made
the subject of barter and sale, then some of the purposes
of the Workmen's Compensation law might be defeated.
A right of action for a personal tort is not property,
and therefore cannot be sold and transferred. It may
result in property by recovery. The judgment, when
once made, could be assigned, but the assignment of the
judgment does not operate to assign the right of action
which might lead to judgment. I refer to an old case
decided by a very able judge, Gibson vs. Gibson (1877);
43 Wis. 23; 28 Am. Rep. 527.
Now, let us examine the authorities cited by the
appellants, and again let it be affirmed that not one of
those cases is in point. The appellants cite:
McGarbey vs. Independent Oil and Gas Co.
(1914) 156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W. 895.
Saudek vs. Milwaukee Electric Co. (1916), 163
Wis. 109; 157 N. W. 579.
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. vs. City of Milwaukee (1916), 164 Wis. 77; 159 U. W. 581.
Martell vs. Kutcher (1927)

w. 522.

Wis.

; 216 N.
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Swanson vs. Lake Superior Terminal and
Transfer Co. (1928)
Wis.
; 219 N. W. 274.
Theby vs. Wisconsin Power and Light Co.
(1929) Wis.
222 N. W. 826.
Same case, 223 N. W. 791.
The respondent cites from Wisconsin, Lehmann vs.
Deuster teal. (1897), 95 Wis. 185; 70 N. W. 170; 37 L. R.
A. 333. If anyone will examine the case reported in 37 L.
R. A., 333, he will ascertain that causes of action for personal injury or death resulting from such injury have
by express statute survived the death of either the person injured or the wrongdoer from an early date in the
State of Wisconsin, and for thJlr.eason such causes of
action have been held assignable. The Wisconsin statute
of 1887, Section 4253, so provides. Consequently we can
eliminate from further consideration the Wisconsin cases
cited by appellants.
But counsel cite Globe Indemnity Co. vs. Toye
Brothers (19:30), 129 So. 234; 14 La. App. 142 (Appellants' brief, P. 25).
Causes of action for personal injuries are made to
survive by early Louisiana statute, Louisiana Civil Code,
Section 2315.

Payne vs. Georgetown Lumber Co. (1906),
117 La. 983; 42 So. 475.
By this statement a further consideration of the
Louisiana case is unnecessary.
Counsel cite Ridley vs. United Sash & Door Co.
(1924), 98 Okla. 80; 224 Pac. 351. On 25 of appellants'
brief it is said, in discussing this case:
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''It was held that the cause of action was assignable back to the employee by the insurance
carrier who paid the compensation and that such
employee could maintain the action.''
By the statement just quoted counsel for appellants
create the suspicion that they have not read this Ridley
case. The Western Union Telegraph Company was the
employer involved in that case and it paid the compensation. There was no insurance carrier. In the next
place, no contention was made, or could have been made,
relative to the assignability of the claim, and for that
reason the Supreme Court of Oklahoma did not pass
upon the validity of the assignment.
For many years prior to the decision in the Ridley
case rights of action for injuries to the person have survived the death of both the wrongdoer and the person
injured, by reason of an express statute in full force and
effect in the State of Oklahoma. (See Sections 5943 and
5944 of the Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909.)

St. Louis and San Francisco R. R. Co. vs.
Goode (1914) 42 Okla. 784; 142 Pac. 1185; L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1915E.
It is there pointed out that Section 5943 of the Oklahoma statute among other things provided for the survival of causes of action for any injury to the person,
and, of course, if such causes of action survive, then they
are in a sense property, and of course can be assigned
under the test generally recognized.
The cases from the Supreme Court of Nebraska, towit: Muncaster vs. Graham Ice Cream Co., (1919), 103
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Neb. 379, 17~ N. \V. 5~, and Thomas vs. Otis Elevator Co.
(1919), 103 Xeb. 401, 172 N. W. 53, are of no value in the
determination of the question involved in the case at bar,
because the Nebraska statute permits either the employer
paying the compensation or the employee to sue, and
where the employer has settled with the employee and
refused to proceed further then the plaintiff has under
this statute of Nebraska a right to proceed.
California case: Morris vs. Standard Oil Co. (1926),
200 Cal. 210, 252 Pac. 605. If this case is to have any effect
at all, it is an authority in favor of the respondent. In
rendering the opinion, Chief Justice Waste pointed out
that the claim assigned was not to be confused with claims
that were peculiarly personal causes of action, saying:
"It must not be confused with those peculiarly personal causes of action arising out of injuries
to the body or feelings of the person injured,
which are not assignable.''
In this Morris case the Ocean Accident Company,
the insurance carrier, had paid out $800.64 for medical
and hospital care and disability indemnity. This was
compensation. Then when the injured plaintiff procured judgment against the Standard Oil company this
award of the insurance company had by order of court
been made a lien on the judgment obtained by the injured plaintiff. In a settlement it had been assigned
to the plaintiff. It was in effect a judgment, and it was
assigned to the plaintiff in the settlement. When it was
not paid it was held he had a right to recover.
The cases from New Mexico, Arizona and Maine are
all controlled by statutes entirely unlike those of Utah.
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Perhaps some comment should be made concerning
a number of Utah cases:

Robinson vs. Industrial Commission (1928)
72 Utah, 203 ; 269 Pac. 513.
This case arose under Section 3133 of Chapter 67
of the Laws of 1921.

Robinson vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1927)
70 Utah, 441; 261 Pac. 9.
Baker vs~ Wycoff (1938) 95 Utah, 199; 79
Pac. (2d) 77.
The cause of action involved in the Baker case was
one for personal injuries existing at common law, whereas, the cause of action claimed in the case at bar is a
creature of statute.
Industrial Commission of Utah vs. Wasatch
Gradin.Q Co. (1932) 14 Pac. (2d) 988; 80 Utah 223.
These cases will be of no great value to the Court
but are cited for its convenience.
An assignment was involved in the case of Fritz vs.
Western Union Telegraph Co. (1903), 25 Utah, 263; 71
Pac. 209. In that case the Court said:
"We do not think that such assignment is
or can be valid or of any effect.''
The action involved in the Fritz case was under the
general death statute, Section 2912 of the Revised Statutes of 1898. Under such a statute (and the authorities
seem relevant here) the holdings have been almost unanimous that the beneficiary's interest is a mere expectancy or an inchoate right, not a debt and not assignable,
and that it abates with death of either the beneficiary
or the wrongdoer.
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Sanders, Adm,inistratrix, vs. Louisville and
.i.Yash rille R. R. (1901), 111 Fed. 708.

The opinion in this case was delivered by Circuit
Judge Lurton and with him concurred Judges Day and
Severns. It was in effect held that no one could be plaintiff in such an action but the one authorized by the terms
of the statute, and that upon the death of a widow beneficiary her right of action, if she had one, did not pass
to her administrator.
CONCLUSION
From these authorities the following conclusions
seem to result :
1. The common law did not give any right to recover

damages in a civil action for and on account of the death
of a human being. That is the general rule today.
2. In practically all of the states, including Utah,
an exception has been created by statute to the above
common law rule allowing a recovery to certain designated beneficiaries named in the statute. The right created by statute in these beneficiaries is a personal one
an does not survive either the death of such beneficiaries
or that of the wrongdoer.
3. The right to recover damages in a civil action
under the statute is not assignable in the absence of express statute making it so. That right given by the statute is a mere personal expectancy.
4. Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933,
prior to amendment in 1939, provided two rights of action in a case where an employee was killed by the negli-
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gent or wrongful act or a third person while such employee was working in the course of his employment.
These two rights were alternative, and the dependents
of the deceased employee had the right to choose one of
such rights, that is, such dependents could claim and
have compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. If such compensation was claimed and awarded,
they did not have any right to sue the negligent third
person. Or the dependents could prosecute an action
against the negligent third person who caused the death
of the employee. If the dependents took the compensation right they did not acquire the right to sue the third
person. On the other hand, if compensation was claimed
and awarded and paid by the employer or insurance carrier, that employer or insurance carrier then acquired
the right to prosecute a civil action for damages for
wrongful death against the negligent third person.
5. It appearing that the plaintiffs have been awarded compensation in this case, they have no right to sue
the defendant. That right belonged to the insurance
carrier who paid the compensation. There is no allegation of payment of that compensation in the complaint.
6. The plaintiff's rights in the case at bar depend
entirely upon the validity of the assignment alleged.
The cause of action was not one that survived under the
statute, and the assignment is absolutely void.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.

MARLON E. WILSON,
Attorney for Respondent.
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